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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This is an appeal of an interlocutory order entitled "Ruling on Motion to Set Aside
Summary Judgment and to Compel Arbitration." See Record at p. 125-129; see also
copy attached at Addendum to this Brief. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
"orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals
does not have original appellate jurisdiction").

II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue Presented

The issue presented is whether the district court erred in ruling that
Defendants/Appellees had not waived their arbitration right, and therefore granting
Defendants/ Appellees' Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the default judgment and compel
arbitration, when Defendants/Appellees were personally served yet failed to appear,
respond to, or raise any defenses to the Complaint; failed to attend the hearing on the
Petition for Default Judgment after being notified thereof by the Court; and failed to raise
the arbitration issue from the date they were personally served on October 27, 2001, past
the date Default Judgment was entered on March 5, 2003, until they finally served a Rule
60(b) Motion on July 9, 2002, raising therein for the first time the issue of arbitration.

1

Standard of Review
The standard of review which governs review of rulings on Rule 60(b) motions
generally is "abuse of discretion." See Board of Educ. v. Cox, 1 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d
806 (Utah 1963). However, the district court's legal conclusion which formed the basis
of the Court's ruling, i.e. that Defendants/Appellees did not waive their arbitration right,
is reviewed for legal correctness, see Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833
P.2d 356 (Utah 1992), and a decision on a Rule 60(b) motion which is premised on
flawed a legal conclusion constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Lund v. Brown, 2000
UT 75, U 9,11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000).
Preservation Below
The issue presented was raised below in Plaintiff/Appellant's "Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from
Default Judgment." See Record at 91-103.
III.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Defendants/Appellees brought their motion to set aside and compel arbitration
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), which provides as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in
the furtherance of justice relieve a party . . . from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:...
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.

2

There is no issue as to the existence of the arbitration clause in the parties'
contract, nor is there an issue that if that clause had been raised properly, it would have
been enforceable; the issue is whether Defendants/Appellees' waived their contractual
arbitration right. Nevertheless, Defendants/Appellees cited Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-3
regarding the enforceability of arbitration clauses, and it is thus included in this
subsection:
A written agreement to submit any existing or future
controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or equity to
set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as provided
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an interlocutory appeal of the district court's "Ruling on Motion to Set
Aside Summary Judgment and to Compel Arbitration." See Record at 125-129.
Plaintiff/Appellant Cedar Surgery Center, L.L.C. (hereafter "Cedar Surgery Center") sued
and personally served Defendants/Appellees Sherry Bonelli and Bonelli & Associates
(hereafter "Bonelli & Associates") on October 28, 2001. See Record at 2-14 (Complaint);
23, 26 (Certificates of Service). After Bonelli & Associates failed to respond, their
default was entered. See Record at 63-64. The Court noticed up a hearing regarding the
petition for entry of default judgment, see Record at 34-35, which Bonelli & Associates
failed to attend. See Record at 38 (Minutes from Hearing). The Court then considered
affidavits provided by Cedar Surgery Center on February 27, 2002, see Record at 41-62,
3

and granted Default Judgment on March 5, 2002. See Record at 63-64. Bonelli &
Associates served a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from
Default Judgment on July 9,2002. See Record at 71-90. The district court granted this
motion, set aside the default judgment, and ordered the parties to arbitrate. See Record at
125-129. Cedar Surgery Center petitioned for permission to file an interlocutory appeal,
which was granted by this Court.
V.
1.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Cedar Surgery Center's Complaint alleges that it entered into contracts with

Bonelli & Associates, whereunder Bonelli & Associates promised to perform specialized,
critical professional services necessary for the newly constructed Cedar Surgery Center to
secure the licenses required for it to begin functioning as a surgical facility, and that this
caused a long delay in Cedar Surgery Center's beginning its surgical business, which in
turn caused huge financial losses. See Record at 2-14 (Complaint).
2.

Bonelli & Associates were personally served in California on October 28,

2001. See Record at 23, 26 (Certificates of Service).
3.

Bonelli & Associates never filed an Answer or a responsive pleading.

See Record, passim, and at 29-30 (Default Certificate).
4.

Bonelli & Associates's default was entered on November 28, 2001. See

Record at 63-64.
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5.

The Court set a January 3,2002 hearing regarding the petition for entry of

default judgment, and sent notice to Bonelli & Associates on January 17, 2001. See
Record at 34-35.
6.

Bonelli & Associates failed to attend the hearing on January 3, 2002. See

Record at 38 (Minutes from Hearing).
7.

On February 7, 2002, Cedar Surgery Center submitted affidavits detailing

the damages it suffered. See Record at 41-62.
8.

On March 5, 2002, the Court granted Default Judgment. See Record at 63-

9.

On July 9, 2002, Bonelli & Associates served a Motion to Compel

64.

Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment. See Record at 7190. The Motion was filed under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) and set forth as its sole
argument for setting aside the default judgment the existence of an arbitration clause in
the parties' contract. See id.
10.

Bonelli & Associates's Memorandum made clear, "This motion is not

brought under any of the typical forgiveness clauses found in subsections (1) through (3)
of Rule 60(b) (i.e. excusable neglect)." See id.
11.

Cedar Surgery Center did not dispute that the arbitration clause would have

been enforceable if properly raised in response to the lawsuit, but argued that Bonelli &

5

Associates had waived their contractual right to arbitrate by not raising it in the course of
the litigation leading up to the granting of judgment in the case. See Record at 91-103.
12.

The district court granted Bonelli & Associates's motion, set aside the

default judgment, and ordered the parties to arbitrate, reasoning that Bonelli & Associates
had not waived their contractual right to arbitrate because they "did not participate in the
litigation whatsoever, and certainly not to a point that could be viewed as 'substantial'
and 'inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate.555 See Record at 125-129 (quoting Central
Fla. Invs. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, % 26, 40 P.3d 599, 609 (Utah 2002)).
VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The right to arbitrate is waivable. Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d
356 (Utah 1992)
Parties who are personally served, fail to file a responsive pleading, allow a default
certificate to be entered, fail to attend the hearing regarding their default after being sent
notice from the Court, and allow substantial time to go buy and default judgment to be
entered against them, all without raising their right to arbitrate, have thereby waived that
right.
Utah case law which allows parties who do not immediately raise arbitration, but
who do so before they engage in substantial participation in the litigation which would be
is inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, see, e.g., Central Fla. Invs., has not addressed
the situation involving parties who fail to respond or participate whatsoever, and allow
6

default judgment to be entered against them. Such parties should not be able to hide
behind a misapplication of the substantial participation standard, citing their very
inaction and ignoring of the litigation process as a justification for relief.
Parties who fail to participate at all in litigation, and allow default judgment to be
entered against them, are most deserving of any litigants of the law's edict that they have
waived their arbitration right. (Remember, too, that Bonelli & Associates did not base
their Rule 60(b) motion on excusable neglect, and that substantial time and a duly-noticed
hearing transpired between the entry of default and the entry of default judgment.)
A standard of law which would allow parties to raise arbitration post default
judgment (without basing their motion on any accompanying grounds to set aside, such as
excusable neglect), would condone and award parties who ignore and fail to respond
whatsoever to the judicial process.
The substantial participation standard rightly comes to the aid of parties who act
properly in response to litigation, i.e., they appear and answer when summoned, and this
standard operates to excuse such litigants if they fail to immediately raise the issue of
arbitration, based on sound underlying reasoning that so long as they do not wait too long,
the right should be enforced. Defendants such as Bonnelli and Associates —who are
personally served yet who failed to take any action whatsoever, throughout a prolonged,
methodical default process leading up to eventual entry of default judgment - do not fit
into this category. Such defendants have waived the opportunity to participate in the
7

litigation and have waived the rights, such as the right to compel arbitration, which they
could have raised if they had responded and participated. The law should not reward
them for refusing to participate whatsoever.
VII.

ARGUMENT

Bonelli & Associates raised only one issue as the basis for their motion to
compel arbitration and to set aside the default judgment: they pointed out that the
contract underlying the case contained an arbitration clause* (which Cedar Surgery
Center does not dispute), and argued that even their post-judgment raising of this
contractual arbitration right justifies setting aside the default judgment under Utah R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(6) ("any reason justifying relief). Bonelli & Associates did not move to
set aside based upon excusable neglect; they even made extra effort to clarify this in
their Memorandum: "This motion is not brought under any of the typical forgiveness
clauses found in subsections (1) through (3) of Rule 60(b) (i.e. excusable neglect)."
The district court erred in granting the motion because Bonnelli & Associates
waived their right to arbitrate. Utah case law is crystal clear that contractual rights to
arbitration are waivable. See Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah
1992). By failing to oppose, appear, defend, or object to the proceedings below, at any
stage during their pendency (default was entered on November 28, 2001; a duly noticed
hearing was held on January 3, 2002; default judgment was entered on March 5, 2002),
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BoneIIi Ac Associates elem h> ^viivcd ihcir arbitration rights and defenses. See id
(iirhiiMikHh ritihls ,nv waivable).
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>c .-edmas
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he

defendants in ihe IIISI-HU nisi were far /wore delinquent than the defendants.in Chandler
* • »•»: 'hi- arbitration issue - indeed they never appeared and raised ihe issue dm nig
the entire pendency of the proceeding iiiu.,.gj.
found that the LJiiimtit t dclend; a .

-:

..*., -.

In/low. if the Court

'. ed arbitration, the deiendants in the instant
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x

Chandler did not specifically address situations where u<jienuaiu:> ua\e wholly failed
to respond or raise the issue of arbitration and have had default judgment entered against them.
This specific issue is an issue of first impression in Utah. Courts from other states that have
addressed the specific issue of arbitration raised for thefirsttime in conjunction with a motion to
set aside default judgment have supported waiver. See, e.g., State ex rel. Barden and Robeson
Corp. v. Hill, 539 S.E.2d 106 (W.V. 2000) (denying writ seeking to overturn court's denial of
motion to set aside default judgment, where motion was based upon argument that the contract
9

The ruling below relies upon a incorrect interpretation and application of the
ruling in Chandler and the meaning of the word "participate" as used therein. The
Chandler Court stated that a party would not be found to have waived arbitration,
despite having failed to raise the issue immediately in their answer, if they did not wait
and participate to such a point in the litigation that their actions were inconsistent with
an intent to arbitrate. See id. at 359. In other words, failing to raise the issue in an
answer or an immediate motion to stay, would not be fatal to arbitration, so long as the
litigants did not wait too long and allow the proceedings to move forward too far. In
this case, the party asserting arbitration did not assert it during the pendency of the
proceedings whatsoever. In this case the defendants defaulted entirely. They ignored
and disregarded these proceedings by (1) choosing not to respond to this lawsuit
following personal service: (2) choosing not to attend or respond to the hearing
regarding default judgment and damages following notice by the Court; and (3)
choosing to do nothing until default judgment had been entered (over three months after
the default certificate was entered) and even until several months had gone by after
default judgment was entered. Bonelli & Associates ignored the summonses, went into
default, ignored the proceedings for months and months, ignored the Court's notice of
hearing on default judgment and damages, and only well after default judgment was

action should have been arbitrated and upon an assertion of arbitration rights thereunder, just as
in this case).
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r i. icij in. (akvliy a^vrinl the right to arbitrate as the sole basis for a 60(h)(6). lioiiclli
& Associates' waiver of arbitration rights is in fact much more clear and "<U»T than vv.i.>i
the defendants' waiver vr C<-K,.t . . .

.
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1

me

lawsuit, and ignored Cedar Snidery 1 "aita us pLiinliH' as well as the Court (i.e. who set
and sent nciki1 ml d nc 11 inr «.1 he default judgment to Bonelli & Associates)until well
• 1 Orient was entered. Buiielli & Associates' non-participation was a willful
choice not to participate or respond or a* s.

mun

>u ludr-g arbitration

• ci1 is all about.

11 \ 'hi ;i) whatsoc

"*/V•-. as well as subsequent cases following Chandler, i.e. < * >/,
v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 I IT "V V 26 -I

?.

-.land loi tiiu

proposition that parties who l»,i\ 1 pn»J>LTI> responded to a lawsuit but who have failed •
•* .!V'*

^ert arbitration rights, may still assert those rights, and will not be

found to have waived them, so long as the hligation iu.. u< u v nu1 ht u -ml M . point
where the assertion of those i ijjjils \\ 'I'M I"*1 inn insistent and unfair with what the
deleiid.iiils had d^nr m the litigation up to that point.
This case is wholly different

"Honelli & Associates LIIOM u > ' > h> i|i, tpioi"1 and

allow the proceedings to go lorwaid WIIII'MII Ihein lm months and months, through

personal service, entry of default, a hearing, submission of affidavits and judgment
paperwork, entry of judgment, and the passage of additional months of time thereafter.
They are not like a party who responds to a lawsuit, and raises and asserts arbitration
rights at some point subsequent to their initial answer, in which case a Court may
consider, under Chandler, still ordering arbitration. No, Bonelli & Associates never
asserted those rights, and allowed the case to be resolved and completed without the
issue ever being raised.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The right to arbitrate is waivable. Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d
356 (Utah 1992)
Parties who are personally served, fail to file a responsive pleading, allow a default
certificate to be entered, fail to attend the hearing regarding their default after being sent
notice from the Court, and allow substantial time to go buy and default judgment to be
entered against them, all without raising their right to arbitrate, have thereby waived that
right.
Utah case law which allows parties who do not immediately raise arbitration, but
who do so before they engage in substantial participation in the litigation which would be
is inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, see, e.g., Chandlers and Central Fla. Invs., has
not addressed the specific situation involving parties who fail to respond or participate
whatsoever, and allow default judgment to be entered against them. Such parties should
12

not ?
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c 'i : their very inaction and ignoring ofihe litigation process as a justitkaihm im n i« i
Parties who fail to participate al <•.. .

.

m .HIJ .ilbm .IHinill indgmenttobe
!

entered against thu. a, _ . . - . ,
waived iheir arbnrimni

ants of the law's edict that they have

- Again, Bonelli & Associates did not base their Ruu -

motion on excusable neglect, and substantial time and a duly-noticed hearing *. .
between the entry of default and the entry ul default judgment >
A standard of law \\\\K\\ wnuM iiJlnvv parlies to raise arbitration post default
,,. : ^ tlieir motion on any accompanying grounds to set aside, sucn as
unable neglect), would condone and award parties v\i„> igj,w; ....::
whatsoever to the judicial process.
I he substantial participant^ ^undard rightly comes to the aid of parties who act
•e tn litigation, i.e., they appear and answer when summoned, and this
standard operates to excuse such litigants if they fail to annkd; >
arbitration, based on sound under!) nig IUIM unng (1 1

long as \\v^ do not wait too long,

the j'l^lit .tiithiiii in' CI\UM\X\\, Defendants such as Bonnelli and Associates —who are
personally served yet who failed to take any action whatsoever, throughout a pi i lionized,
methodical default process leading up to eventual.;

' : !

into this category ... . > ,,;...,,lair

-.,-.., *. ?*> participate in ilk-

•..-..,:...

i
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-.> not fit

^uch as the right 10 compel arbitration. \\hich tu~r

could have raised if they had responded and participated. The law should not reward
them for refusing to participate whatsoever.
Wherefore Plaintiff asks the Court reverse and remand this case to the district
court, directing it to rule that Bonelli waived its arbitration rights and vacate its ruling
on Bonelli5s motion to set aside and compel arbitration.
DATED this 17th day of March, 2003,
JENSEN, GRAFF & BARNES, LLP

RANDALL C. ALLEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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FILED

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AUG ! 9
,

»

nth DISTRICT OOUHT
IRON COUNTY
DEPUTY CLERK.
fry,*-.

CEDAR SURGERY CENTER, 1,1 .('..

RULING ON MOTION TO SET ASIDE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION

Plaintiff,
vs.
SHERRY BONELLI (individually and dba
Bonelli & Associates), and BONELLI &
ASSOCIATES, a California general
partnership,

Case

•

\

Judge J. Philip Lves
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendants Mi ..•;.;•
Arbitration and Rule 60(b) I ( Inlum lur

ISVIIH'IMI

• -j A

i Vtmilt J m I giiuiil, filed July 12/2002. Plaintiff

filetl ,iii < Opposition thereto on July 22, 200?. mid Defendants tiled a Reply on July 30, 2002
The matter was heard on August 1..:, AH)^ at w.iu. u^...
Having reviewed The (tatties itictnoi'itr ' -

,

^ • i-

.•>.•:.••

- • "v-aul the- panics* arguments, having ro u ^ed

the relevant law on the matter, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court now rules as
fellows.

CKGROUND
Plaintiff Cedar Surgen t enu.. .

-

^ndant Sherry

Itiiiielli and lin pnrlncrslup - ^ ^ u n b e r \\J9 20ui. Piamulf had I)elendants personally served

-2with a Summons and Complaint on October 28, 2001. Defendants did not file an answer, or any
other response, to the Complaint. Plaintiff took Default against Defendants on November 29,
2001. Defendants filed the current Motion on July 12, 2002, seeking to enforce a provision of
the contract between the parties that provided that all disputes between the parties would be
submitted to binding arbitration.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants waived the right to arbitration by inaction and a complete
failure to respond in any way to the Complaint. Plaintiff point to the fact that Defendants did not
assert the right to arbitration until eight (8) months after Default had been taken.
Defendants argue that there has been no "substantial participation" in this litigation by
them, and no evidence of an intent to waive arbitration, and thereby no waiver of the right to
arbitrate.
Neither party has been able to locate any Utah case law that squarely addresses the factual
setting of this case.

ANALYSIS
Defendant here took no steps at all that could be viewed as participation in the litigation,
let alone substantial steps as required under the law, and cannot be said to have waived the right
to arbitration.
As the Utah Supreme Court held in Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 365,
(Utah 1992), "a waiver occurs when the party seeking arbitration substantially participates in
litigation, to a point inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, and this participation results in
prejudice to the opposing party." Chandler, at 358. The Court did not define "participation", but
the clear inference from the case law is that one must answer the complaint or motion the court

-3for relief, other than a dismissal, before one can be said to have participated in the litigation.
In I he present L.I «i\ Delcndanl did nulliiiijj »il all '"Jini s r n n l \\\\\\ the i 'miiplainl ^ h u h
* o u h e d HI the entry oi\i-L,uh

- is difficult to see how Defendant thereby "substantially

~" . v • • paicvi - - • i; K, i Uit_,aiv:.

. ,

iv.i-w:

tlii.1 m d,'"' [t]he par (:> claiming A aiv er has

the burden of establishing participation and preuidiee " ('handler, at ?oli Plaintiffs here argue
that "Defendants' non-participation, was a wmfui choice not to participate or respond 01 iv .
defenses or rights (ineludin|> arbitration rights). ."'""" Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, J 3
(emphasis in original). It appears the even the Plaintiff agrees LH.H JK n .uion ofthe Defendants
vus not pmliupulion, bill .i division im i m participate.
htionally, the Chandler court stated thai tor waiver of the right to arbitration to occi it,
the s.

•

! .-a- u •,

•

tic . . .".

Chandler, at ^ 8 . It cannot in uood faith be argued that Deleodants" choice not to do a thing was
inconsistent

:

-

^

litigation, the Defendants would seem to be asserting their right to have the dispute submitted to
at I titration, rather than In become involved JII the litigation lilnl by Hie I I.iinlill in i imtrnvenlioii
0f

fa contract terms.
Further, as held by UIL I ;iun upteme Court in Cent. Fla. Invs., J.I^. -. i-aiKwest Assocs.,

2002 U r3,40P.3d599:
This first part of the Chandler test [determining wb. ; .
re was sn1
il 1
participation to a point inconsistent with the intent
•»^
actions of the party seeking arbitration, and wheth
., an
intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through
litigation.
Cent. Fla. Invs.. Inc., at f26, K) P 3< ! i til • 5 D5

-4Here, Defendants certainly took no actions which could be viewed as evidencing "an
intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court."
Because of its determination that the Defendants did not substantially participated in this
matter, and certainly not to a point inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, the Court need not
reach the second part of the test set forth in Chandler, whether Plaintiff was prejudiced by
Defendants actions (or inaction).

CONCLUSION
Defendants here undertook no action when served with the complaint herein and
therefore did not participate in the litigation whatsoever, and certainly not to a point that could be
viewed as "substantial" and "inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate." Defendants' Motion to
Compel Arbitration is therefore granted, and the parties are ordered to submit to arbitration as
provided in the parties' contract.
The Default Judgment entered by this Court is hereby set aside as such judgment was
obtained in contravention of terms of the parties' contract1, and therefore falls under Rule
60(b)(6), which provides for relief from judgment "for any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment."
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 19th day of August 2002.

J./HILIP EVES
district Court Judge

Plaintiffs disregard for the mandatory arbitration clause could be viewed as a breach of the parties'
contract.

-5-

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of August 2002,1 mailed true and correct copies of
the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following:

Randall C. Allen, Esq.
JENSEN, GRAFF & BARNES, LLP
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, UT 84721
Mike E. Storts, Esq.
HUGHES & BURSELL, P.C.
187 N. 100 West
St. George, UT 84770

Deputy Court Clerk

356

Uuh

833 PACIFIC REPORTER. 2d SERIES

Dr. Thomas E. CHANDLER, Dr. Michael
E. Allen. Dr. Clark Fullmer. Dr. Rodney W. Livingston. Dr. Garth L. Nelson.
Dr. Gene M. Richards, Dr. Phillip II.
Spencer. Dr. Give C. Ingram. Dr. David
B. Hincks. Dr. Aldean Washburn, and
Dr. Paul R. Olsen. individually and on
behalf of Members of the Utah Dental
Association. Plaintiffs and Appellees.
v.
BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF UTAH,
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Company, a Massachusetts corporation.
Gary I). Henderson. Steven G. Sholy.
and Utah Dental Association, a Utah
incorporated association, Defendants
and Appellants.
No syn-,10
Supreme Court of Utah
May 15, 1<J92.
Insurer moved to compel arbitration
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Timothy R Hanson, J , denied motion, and
insurer appealed The Supreme Court,
Hall, C.J., held that* (I) evidence supported
finding that insurer participated in litigation to point inconsistent with arbitration,
and (2) evidence supported finding of prejudice to insured arising from insurer's delay
of assertion of right to arbitrate.
Affirmed.
Zimmerman, J , concurred in part, dissented in part, and filed opinion in which
Houe. Associate CJ. joined.
1. Arbitration e=»23.4
Waiver of right of arbitration must be
based on both finding of participation in
litigation to point inconsistent with intent
to arbitrate and finding of prejudice; both
prongs of this test turn on facts of individual case; furthermore, any real detriment
is sufficient to support finding of prejudice.

stantial participation in litigation to no'
inconsistent with intent to arbitrate a^
prejudice, that prejudice must relate to dX
lay in assertion of right to arbitrate and
that prejudice must be of such nature thai
party opposing arbitration suffers somS
real harm are legal standards, and whether
trial court employed proper standard for
finding waiver presents legal question
which is reviewed for correctness
3. Arbitration <s=>23.25
In determining whether right of arU
tration was waived, finding of existence of
substantial participation in litigation to
point inconsistent with intent to arbitrate
and of existence of prejudice are factual in
nature and should be reviewed as factual
determinations
1. Insurance C=».">7fi(l)
Finding that insurer participated in liti
gallon to point inconsistent with arbitration
was supported by facts that insurer filed
answer and cross claim, participated in dis
covery for five months, and reviewed discovery that had taken place prior to its
entrance into case
5. Insurance <£=>572
Finding of prejudice to insureds resulting from insurer's delay of assertion of
right of arbitration was supported by facts
that insurer was able to take part in discovery process which was far more extensive than that allowed in arbitration and
obtained information which could be used
against insureds in arbitration, and that
insureds undertook much of expense necessary to prepare case for trial in conducting
discovery and preparing to respond to «n
surer's discovery request.

Norman J. Younker, Michael L Chides
ter, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appel
lees.
Timothy C. Houpt, Salt Lake City, ^t
Blue Cross Blue Shield.
Phillip S. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, f°r
Massachusetts Mut Life Ins. Co
2. Arbitration <s=»23.4
D. Gary Christian, Heinz J. Mahler. Salt
Requirements that ruling on waiver of Lake City, for Steven G. Sholy and Gary D
right of arbitration rest on finding of sub- Henderson.
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David G. Williams, Salt Lake City, for
tah Dental Ass'n.

For the next five months, Blue Cross
actively participated in discovery. On December 12, 1988, plaintiffs served a request
for production of documents on Blue Cross.
HALL, Chief Justice:
On December 21 and 22, Blue Cross particiDefendant Blue Cross Blue Shield of pated in the depositions of three Massachuftah appeals the denial of its motion to setts Mutual officials. These depositions
ampel arbitration. We affirm.
were conducted in Springfield, MassachuThe plaintiffs in this action are members setts. On December 30, 1988, plaintiffs
f the Utah Dental Association ("UDA"). requested a rule 30(bX6) designation of corn November of 1987, plaintiffs filed a com- porate spokesman from Blue Cross in conlaint in the Third Judicial District Court junction with the deposition of Blue Cross's
sserting that Massachusetts Mutual Life vice president On January 23, 1989, Blue
nsurance Company, Massachusetts Mutual Cross designated its corporate spokesman.
gents Gary D. Henderson and Steven G. On February 2, 1989, Blue Cross particiiholy, and the UDA are liable for the can- pated in the deposition of its vice president
and circulated a stipulation for a protective
eilation of their health insurance.
order among all parties On February 8,
The complaint alleged that in 1975, the 1989, UDA submitted interrogatories to
JDA entered into an agreement with Blue Blue Cross. On February 24, 1989, Blue
>oss whereby the UDA agreed to endorse Cross participated in the deposition of MasSlue Cross's health insurance plan and sachusetts Mutual general agent, Larry
Jlue Cross agreed to insure all UDA mem- Hanks. On March 9, 1988, plaintiffs
bers regardless of any preexisting illnesses served a request for production of doc>r disabilities. In July of 1987, the UDA uments on Blue Cross. On March 19, 1989,
ancelled its endorsement of Blue Cross Blue Cross served interrogatories and a
md began encouraging UDA members to request for production of documents on
>btam health insurance from Massachu- plaintiffs. On March 21, 1989, Massachusetts Mutual. When Blue Cross discovered setts Mutual answered Blue Cross's crosshat the UDA no longer endorsed its health claims.
nsurance, it notified UDA members that
On March 30, 1989, Blue Cross respond•heir benefits would terminate. Thereed to the UDA's first set of interrogatories
after, plaintiffs applied for coverage under
and raised, for the first time, a right of
Massachusetts Mutual's health plan, but arbitration. Nevertheless, Blue Cross
coverage was denied due to serious illness- raised specific objections and provided anes and physical impairments.
swers to the interrogatories.
The named defendants answered the
complaint, and discovery procedures were
commenced. On November 2, 1988, plaintiffs amended their complaint, joining Blue
Cross as a defendant On November 22,
*988, Blue Cross answered the complaint,
Rising seventeen defenses but making no
Mention of the existence of an arbitration
agreement On this date, Blue Cross also
"led cross-claims against the UDA, Massachusetts Mutual, Henderson, and Sholy,
^teging the rights to indemnity, apportionment of
liability, and attorney fees.

On April 7, 1989, Blue Cross filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings. During argument on this motion, plaintiffs asserted that no contractual
right of arbitration existed ' and, in the
alternative, that Blue Cross waived its
right to compel arbitration. The trial court
issued a memorandum decision, ruling that
Blue Cross had waived any alleged right of
arbitration by "actively participating] in
the litigation process" and that such participation has "been to the extent that arbitration would work a substantial prejudice on

*the
K . . C . r o s s a«"gucd that it sent an addendum to
, . c °n8»nal insurance policy, which contained
n £ arfbrilrali<>n clause, to plaintiffs. Several
' Plaintiffs claimed that they never received the

addendum. Because of the court's ruling on the
issue of waiver, it did not address whether a
contractual right of arbitration existed.
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the remaining parties." Pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-31a-19(l), Blue Cross appeals the trial court's denial of its motion
to force arbitration 2
This case presents an issue of first impression in this court: What standard
should be employed in determining whether
a party has waived a contractual right of
arbitration? Although there is authority to
the contrary, 3 several jurisdictions have
held that a waiver occurs when the party
seeking arbitration substantially participates in litigation, to a point inconsistent
with an intent to arbitrate, and this participation results in prejudice to the opposing
party. 1 These cases base the requirement
of prejudice on a recognition of a public
policy in favor of arbitration. 5 Because
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 7 S - 3 1 a - l 9 ( | ) provides. "An
appeal may be taken bv any aggrieved party as
provided by law for appeals on civil actions
from any court order: (I) denying a m o t i o n to
compel a r b i t r a t i o n . "
For cases h o l d i n g that
there is a right to a direct appeal from a denial
of a m o t i o n d e n y i n g arbitration w h e n a statute
or rule expressly authorizes an appeal, see
David B. H a r r i s o n . Annotation.
Appealability—
Court Arbitration Order. 6 A.LR.4th 652. 675-78
(1981).

3.

See, e.g.. City of Niagara Falls v. Rudolph, 91
A.D.2d 817. 4S8 N.Y.S.2d 97. 98 (1982); De Sapio v. Kohlmeyer,
35 N.Y.2d 402. 362 N.Y.S.2d
843. 846. 321 N.E.2d 770, 772 (1974).

4.

See, e.g.. Page v. Moseley. Hallgarten,
Esta
brook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291. 293 (1st
Cir.1986); Price v. Drexel Burnham
Lambert,
Inc.. 791 F.2d 1156. 1158 (5th Cir.1986); Rush v.
Oppenheimer
& Co.. 779 F.2d 885. 887 (2d Cir.
1985); Sweater Bee by Banff v. Manhattan
In
dus.. 754 F.2d 457. 463 (2d Cir.). cert, denied.
474 U.S. 819. 106 S.Ct. 68. 88 I. lid.2d 55 (1985);
Reid Burton Constr. v. Carpenters Dist. Council.
614 F.2d 698. 702 (10th Cir.1980); J & S Constr.
Co. v. Travelers Indent. Co.. 520 F.2d 809, 809-10
(1st Cir.1975). Keating v. Superior
Court of
Alameda County. 31 Cal.3d 584. 183 Cal.Rptr
360. 372-73. 645 P.2d 1192. 1204-05 (1982). appeal dismissed in part. 465 U.S. 1. 104 S.Ct. 852.
79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984); Board of Educ. Taos Mun.
Schools v. The Architects,, 103 N.M. 462. 709
P.2d 184. 185 (1985). Wood v. Millers Natl Ins..
96 N.M. 525. 632 P.2d 1163. 1165 (1981); United
Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co.. 93 N.M.
105. 597 P.2d 290. 300. cert, denied, 444 U.S
911. 100 S.Ct. 222. 62 L.Ed.2d 145 (1979).

5.

See, e.g.. Page. 806 F.2d at 293; Rush, 779 F.2d
at 887; Sweater Bee by Banff, 754 F.2d at 461;
Reid Burton Constr., 614 F.2d at 702; J 6i S
Constr. Co.. 520 F.2d at 810; Board of Educ

this court has also recognized the strong
public policy in favor of arbitration "as an
approved, practical, and inexpensive means
of settling disputes and easing court congestion." * it is appropriate to look to these
jurisdictions for guidance.
At first glance, the cases that apply this
approach appear to reach disparate results. 7 However, closer examination reveals that the main reason for the discrepancies lies not in inconsistent application of
the test, but rather, in the fact that the
finding of both substantial participation
and prejudice are factual determinations.*
Therefore, results vary, depending on the
facts presented in a particular case.
Indeed, while there is some conflict in
the case law,9 most courts consistently ap7r;«,s Uun Schools.
709 P.2d at
Nuclear Corp.. 597 P.2d at 299
6.

185.

I mta!

Hobmson & Wells. P.C r. Warren. 669 l\2d
844. H16 (Utah 1983); see also Lin don City v.
Engineer* Constr. Co.. 636 P.2d 1070. 107 3 (Utah
1981) Ciannopulos
v. Pappas. 15 P 2d 153. 356
(Utah

1932).

7.

In Bernalillo County Medical Center Employees' Association
v. Cancelosi, 92 N.M. 307. 587
P 2d 960. 962 (1978). the New Mexico Supreme
Court stated that an "extensive and brutally di
verse body of law exists as to at what stage of
the court proceedings waiver may be presented
and determined."

8.

See. e.g.. Reid Burton Constr., 614 F.2d at 702
("(Waiver) depends upon the facts of each
case."); Burton-Dixie
Corp. v. Timothy McCarthy Constr Co.. 436 F.2d 405. 408 (5th Cir. 1971)
("[Waiver} depends upon the facts of each
c a s e . ) . Weight Watchers of Quebec. Ltd. »••'
Weight Watchers Intl, Inc.. 398 F.Supp 1057.
1059 (F.-.D.N.Y.1975) ("[Waiver turnsj on all the
facts of the case."); Keating, 183 Cal Rptr at
372. 645 P 2d at 1204 ("[Tlhe question of waiver
is one of fact."); Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge. 23
Cal.3d 180. 151 Cal.Rptr. 837. 839. 588 P.2d
1261. 1263 (1979) ("Waiver of a contractual
right to arbitration is ordinarily a question of
fact."); Board of Educ. Taos Mun. Schools. 709
P.2d at 185 ("[Waiver] depends on the facts of
each case"). United Nuclear Corp., 597 P 2d at
300 ( T h e question should be determined by the
trier of facts based on the evidence in each
case.').

9,

Compare Wood, 632 P.2d at 1166 (arbitration
waived when right asserted after adverse ruling
on a motion to dismiss) with Rush, 779 F 2d at
888 (filing motion to dismiss not inconsistent
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ply the same legal principles. The party
claiming waiver has the burden of establishing substantial participation and prejudice.10 While the party seeking arbitration
must participate in the litigation to a point
inconsistent with arbitration, once this
point has been reached, the determination
of whether waiver has occurred rests solely
on a finding of prejudice.11 Furthermore,
the prejudice must result from the delay in
the assertion of the right to arbitrate, not
from factors that are inherent in arbitration itself, such as the severance of a claim
or limitations on remedies.12
Though the cases consistently apply
these principles, there is some conflict concerning what particular facts are sufficient
to support a finding of prejudice.13 However, there is general agreement concerning the prejudicial nature of certain factual
situations. Courts have recognized that
prejudice can occur if a party gains an

advantage in arbitration through participation in pretrial procedures.14 Courts
have also stated that prejudice exists when
the party seeking arbitration is attempting
to forum-shop after "the judicial waters
[have] . . . been tested." , s In addition,
prejudice has been found in situations
where the party seeking arbitration allows
the opposing party to undergo the types of
expenses that arbitration is designed to
a n e viate, such as the expense of preparing
to a r g u e i mpor tant pretrial motions " or
t h e e x p e n s e 0 f conducting discovery proced u r e s t h a t a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e Jn arbitration."
The finding of prejudice, however, has never been linked to any specific type of harm,

with intent to arbitrate). See also infra notes 17
and 20.

Board of Educ. Taos Mun. Schools. 709 P.2d at
186.

10. See. e.g.. Page, 806 F.2d at 293-94; Price. 791
F.2d at 1158; Keating. 183 Cal.Rptr. at 372, 645
P.2d at 1204; Board of Educ. Taos Mun.
Schools. 709 P.2d at 185; United Nuclear Corp..
597 P.2d at 300.

17. See. e.g.. Price. 791 F.2d at 1160; Board of
Educ. Taos Mun. Schools. 709 P.2d at 186; see
also Rush. 779 F.2d at 889. However, no prejudice results if the discovery relates to nonarbitrable claims which will be severed and separately litigated, see. e.g.. Rush, 779 F.2d at 889;
Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d
638, 642 (7th Cir.1981). and there is some conflict concerning the prejudicial nature of the
initial stages of discovery. Compare Price, 791
F.2d at 1159-60 (discovery initiated by parly
claiming waiver should be considered when determining prejudice) and Board of Educ. Taos
Mun. Schools. 709 P.2d at 185-86 (initial stages
of discovery found to be prejudicial because
party seeking arbitration has both benefited
from discovery and forced opposing party to
undergo expense) with Sweater Bee by Banff.
754 F.2d at 464 (no prejudice from discovery
because discovery can be used in arbitration
and additional discovery can be ordered) and
Keating. 645 P.2d at 1206 (no prejudice from
discovery because court ordered party seeking
arbitration to cease discovery or extend equal
discovery to party claiming waiver). While it is
clear that there is disagreement over the prejudicial nature of discovery, it is important to
note that factual differences—i.e., size and complexity of the case, degree of discovery available
under the particular arbitration contract, and
degree of discovery available under the appropriate jurisdiction's arbitration statute—may explain some of the discrepancies.

U. See, e.g., Page, 806 F.2d at 293; Rush, 779
F.2d at 887; Sweater Bee by Banff. 754 F.2d at
461; J & S Constr. Co.. 520 F.2d at 810; Keating.
183 Cal.Rptr. at 372. 645 P.2d at 1204; Board of
Educ. Taos Mun. Schools, 709 P.2d at 185; United Nuclear Corp.. 597 P.2d at 300.
I*. See Rush, 779 F.2d at 890; Sweater Bee by
Banff. ISA F.2d at 463.
U- Sec United Nuclear Corp.. 597 P.2d at 299,
where the New Mexico Supreme Court stated.
lT]hcrc is disagreement from case to case as to
what set of facts will justify a holding that a
party has waived his rights to arbitration." See
also infra note 17.
u

- See, e.g.t Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389
P2d 692. 696 (2d Cir.1968); Liggett & Myers Inc.
* Bloomficld. 380 F-Supp. 1044. 1047-48
(S.D.N.Y.1974); Board of Educ. Taos Mun.
Schools. 709 P.2d at 186.

Xl%

Woo
<l. 632 P.2d at 1165; see also Jones Motor
y- v- c"*uffeurs, 671 F.2d 38. 43 (1st Cir.)t cert.
«?!*d. 459 U.S. 943. 103 S.Ct. 257. 74 L.Ed.2d
**> (1982).

^ L 5 ^ «•*-. Price, 791 F.2d at 1160; Weight
Etchers of Quebec Ltd.. 398 F.Supp. at 1061;

[1] The general approach used in these
cases is consistent with our case law dealing with arbitration.18 Mere delay should
not result' in a waiver of a method of dispute resolution that public policy clearly

18. See supra note 6.
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favors. However, there is an affirmative
duty to enforce contractual rights; ,9 it is
not the policy of this court to allow a party
to suffer prejudice because an opposing
party has failed to timely assert a contractual right. We therefore adopt the principle that waiver of a right of arbitration
must be based on both a finding of participation in litigation to a point inconsistent
with the intent to arbitrate and a finding of
prejudice. As noted above, both prongs of
this test turn on the facts of the individual
case. Furthermore, consistent with the
policy considerations, any real detriment is
sufficient to support a finding of prejudice
12,31 It is also to be observed that
there is some confusion concerning the ap
plicable standard of review of a trial
court's ruling *ha! .«. pa:-*.;, has waived \':-.'right to arbitrate '" We arc of the vie v.
that the requirements that a ruling of waiv
er must rest on findings of substantial
participation and prejudice, that the preju
dice must relate to the delay in the asser
lion of the right to arbitrate, and that th.prejudice be of such a nature that the party
opposing arbitration suffers some real
harm are legal standards. Whether the
trial court employed the proper standards
presents a legal question which is reviewed
for correctness. 21 However, the finding of
the existence of substantial participation
19.

See Jones Motor

Co.. 671 F 2d at 42.

20. See Price, 791 P.2d at 1159 ("It a p p e a r s to us
that a finding that a party has waived its right to
a r b i t r a t i o n is a legal conclusion subject to our
plenary review, but that the findings upon
which the conclusion is based are predicated
q u e s t i o n s of fact, which may not be o v e r t u r n e d
unless clearly erroneous." (emphasis in origi
nal)); Shinto Shipping <>>. v. f'ibrcx <C Shipping
Co., 572 F 2d 1328. I l i l (9th Cir.1978) ("We
must uphold the district court's decision unless
we find an abuse of discretion.");
Southwest
Indust. Import & Export. Inc v. Wilmod Co.. 524
F 2d 468. 470 n. 3 (5th Cir.1975) ("Wc consider
the question of waiver to be a conclusion of law
not subject to the structures of limited review
dictated by F.R.Civ.P 52(a) as to factual find
ings of the Trial Court."). Burton-Dixie
Corp .
436 F.2d at 408 ("The question d e p e n d s upon
the facts of each case and usually must be
determined by the trier of facts").
21. See, e.g., Creer v. Valley Bank <£ Trust. 770
P.2d 113. 114 (Utah 1988). Scharf v BMC Corp.
700 P.2d 1068. 1070 (Utah 1985)

and the finding of the existence of prejudice are factual in nature. 22 Therefore, the
existence of these factors should be reviewed as factual determinations -'
A reading of the trial court's memorandum decision reveals that the court employed the proper legal standard and based
its ruling on the findings of substantial
participation and prejudice.21 Since the underlying facts are not in dispute, the dispositive issue is whether there is sufficient
support in the record to uphold the trial
court's findings.
(41 The record clearly supports the finding that Blue Cross participated in the litigation to a point inconsistent with arb;tra
lion. Before Blue Cross moved to .••»!•. ;>--l
.-.I'bitratio:!. it filed an answer, filed «•> cr •».-•>
claim, participated m discovery !»-r ;;•.•;
months, and reviewed the discovery \\-..\l
had already taken place prior to its entrance into the case. These actions ••l*-.ir:y
manifest an intent to proceed to t r t l
1.5 | The record also supports the finding
of prejudice. The prejudice is apparent
from Blue Cross's participation in discovery viewed in conjunction with the fact
that there are multiple defendants in the
case. It is clear from its cross-claim thai
part of Blue Cross's defense is that Massa
22. See. e.g.. Rcid Burton Constr., 614 F.2d at 702
Burton-Dixie
Corp., 436 F.2d at 408; Weigh
Watchers. 398 F.Supp. at 1059; Keating. IS
Ca! Rptr at 372. 64 5 P.2d at 1204; Doers. i ;
Cal.Rptr at 839. 588 P.2d at 1263. Board "
[.due Taos Mun. Schools. 709 P.2d at l 8 x / ' " "
cd Nuclear Corp. 597 P.2d at 300.
23. .Set.-, e.g.. Docile v. Bradley. 784 P.2d I 1 ; r
1 1 78 (Utah 1989); Rcid v. Mutual of Omaha /-;.
Cn. 776 P 2 d 896. 899 (Utah 1989). U a
K C o P. 52(a); see also Rcid Burton Constr . 61
F 2d at 702; Burton-Dixie
Corp., 436 F.2d at 40:
Weight Watchers. 398 F.Supp. at 1059; A>w»"i
183 Cal.Rpir. at 372. 645 P.2d at 1204. Doer
151 Cal.Rptr. at 839. 588 P.2d at 1263; Board t
Educ Taos Mun. Schools, 709 P.2d at 185; Unt
ed Nuclear Corp., 597 P.2d at 300.
24. Although the trial court did not make seprate findings of fact, memorandum decisior
may be regarded as findings of fact.
Thomas
Thomas. 569 P 2d 1119. 1121 (Utah 1977)

ctfJ^lERPviJ^iJ^<fc'K6s9eBB(ifi,§HiELD

<*tftkh ^36i

cf. ateutarad 3S6.(uuii> iww
'X<m£tMmifo'is''>restir&lbWfMiany
al- ^Wia^ofiTniVe^ns^ne^liai^WFrep^re

^whiMall^lreadytakVrPmce^Th'eihfor-

'SML* » ' /

«

.

concur.
It must also be remembered that, as Blue
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:-(Concurring and
Cross points out in its brief, there is only a ^Dissenting^ri^v- ^.t9b /** it.
lhnit& Segree of discoVej^ available in ar- ^ r-&nfcrfwith thf majority's*statement of
titration,*? and at the time if the motion to «tHd legal 'standard for detennihing whether
compel, the discovery'relating to Massachu- a»$arty to% an agreement has waived a right
setts Mutual's liability was far more ad to * demand "arbitration^' Both substantial
vanced than was the discovery relating to participation to a point inconsistent with an
Blue Cross's liability Blue Cross there
intent to arbitrate and» prejudice are re
fore obtained a benefit from its delay in the quired These requirements are consistent
assertion of the right to arbitrate that with Utah public policy favoring arbitra
would not have been available had Blue tion. Unfortunately, the way the majority
Cross timely moved to stay the proceedings applies this standard undermines this deand compel arbitration2S
clared policy Without addressing the first
The finding of prejudice is also supported of-,these elements, I find that I cannot
by the expense that plaintiffs undertook in agree that the evidence of prejudice is suf^conducting*discovery into Blue'Cross's lia- ficient^ support a finding that, as a matbility and in prepanng to' respond to Blue cterf'pyawff $ e secondielement is 'satisfied.
^Cross's? discovery ^equest^J The policies ^ffcRet^ding^(iie%t^daM'vo^review7l Jfind
{favoring, arbitration are largely defeated ^tK^rt^dnty'a^positioB'pifzzlin^^ The*" trial
when the ..right of arbitration is not raised court made'no factual findings on disputed
until an opposing party has undertaken evidence in dete/rainingv that the standard
|,fi
[WJithin that period the" [party seeking arbi
H*5. p i e arbitration clause which Blue Cross
*/ claims is*part of the insurance policy provides i "U tration]"actively participated"Jin the* deposi-j that all disputes should be submitted to arbitra cL«rations of the parties or witnesses; objected to
tp tioh under, the "rules of the American Arbitra
y questions and cross-examined witnesses, ex
o tion. Association " The rule o£ the American
ammed and made copies of documents, ob1
3» Arbitration Association applicable' to discovery
tamed adjournments of scheduled depositions
W provides/ "Consistent with the expedited nature
to accommodate his^clients; received from
•£ of arbitration, the arbitrator may « establish
[the parties claiming waiver] transcripts of all
s
JLtW l5*c c x l ent of and schedule for the production
depositions taken prior to entry into the case
- °* relevant documents and other information"
[of the party seeking arbitration] as well as
v. (Emphasis added)
exhibits up to that date
In sum, the mov
ant obtained many benefits from the pretrial
/io c^^cyeral cases have observed that waiver can
discovery process in,this lawsuit which would
fot0^111^ ' ^ s u c h circumstances. See\ e.g. Carcich,
g * * 8 9 ^ ^ * 6 9 6 , * Uggett <fr Myers Inc.l0L38O
(t not hayc been available had they demanded
K'-I^HPRb** 1047-48; Board ol Educ. Taos Muru
' . arbitration! reasonably Rafter the third-party
M&frJ$yM~*l
186. Indeed, the faefs tn
- ^ W m p l i i S ^ a s ^ r V a i . ^ ' * ^'l ^ *- ? 1*
J » a r e ¥ f e i l a 7 Yo? the i n W f c a k T , I&e// is s. UggeW, iQMytrs \lnc.j*386,FS\ipp? at«1047-48.
r
^ a w m v o l v i n ^ m u l t i p l e defendants; claims of
W^^ftpn^llnda contractual rightjpf arbitra18 Wiro*n^he plaintiff and one of the dercn. ft * * % ! » w i s joVhed rile iri the case. Jn
ilaboRushPTJ*?2d
at 8 8 9 . ^
>-*fi ivr
; finding'that waived had occurred. thecoWr ob-

'fe*

I **» *<
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for waiver was met, and there was no
dispute as to the relevant facts. Therefore, we have no occasion to search for any
substantial evidence that might support a
trial court's factual finding of prejudice
The trial judge was either correct in concluding that the uncontroverted facts satisfied the legal standard or he was not.
There is no room here for the exercise of
trial court discretion on this question. Yet
the majority seems to apply a "clear error"
standard to uphold the trial judge's ruling.
This appeal presents a plain question of
law. Is the evidence sufficient to support a
legal conclusion that both elements of
waiver are present? See Page v Moseley,
Hallgarten,
Estabrook & Weeden, Inc.,
806 F2d 291, 294 (1st Cir.i986) I think
not
I proceed directly to the second element.
Neither the majority nor plaintiffs are able
to point to an\ real prejudice resulting
from Blue Cross's filing pleadings and participating in tins litigation over the four
and one-half months between the time it
entered an appearance and the time it
sought arbitration And to put thih matter
in perspective, it must be noted that plaintiffs and defendants other than Blue Cross
had been engaged in this litigation for one
year before the Blue Cross defendants
were made parties.
It is true that Blue Cross filed pleadings,
but that fact certainly did not cause legally
sufficient prejudice to plaintiffs. As for
the discovery that the majority says Blue
Cross "actively participated in" in the few
months following its being joined as a party, Blue Cross was nothing more than a
passive participant in depositions initiated
by plaintiffs and directed primarily at Massachusetts Mutual. Respecting other discovery, it is hard to understand how plaintiffs were significantly prejudiced by having Blue Cross produce documents in response to plaintiffs' request for production
and answering plaintiffs' interrogatories.
And as for Blue Cross's discovery requests
directed to plaintiffs, they were never answered and there is no evidence in the
record that plaintiffs expended any time or
effort on them.

At bottom, all we have here is the passage of close to five months and the almost
entirely passive participation of a newly
joined party in ongoing litigation. I would
hold that the articulated legal standard
adopted by the court cannot be satisfied by
such circumstances. I would reverse and
remand with direction that the Blue Cross
arbitration claim be addressed on its merits
and that, to the extent an arbitration clause
is binding on any of the parties, arbitration
be ordered
HOWE, Associate C.J , concurs in the
concurring and dissenting opinion of
Justice ZIMMERMAN.
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Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S.
Sawaya, J., of aggravated sexual assault
and aggravated burglary. Defendant appealed The Court of Appeals, Greenwood,
J., held that: (i) trial court has no affirmative duty to sua sponte engage in on-therecord colloquy with defendant at time of
trial to ensure valid waiver of right tc
testify, and (2) trial court's reasonable
doubt instruction did not contain inappro
priate language which reasonable juroi
might have interpreted as allowing finding
of guilt based on degree of proof belov*
that required by due process clause.
Affirmed.

settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335.
propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A.L.R.3d 1101.
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
AL.R.3d 126.
Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.

Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Court reporter's death or disability prior to
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049.
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages
alone new trial granted on ground of inadequacy of damages — modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th
875.
After-acquired evidence of employee's misconduct as barring or limiting recovery in action for wrongful discharge, 34 A.L.R.5th 699.
Inattention of juror from sleepiness or other
cause as ground for reversal or new trial, 59
A.L.R.5th 1.
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
damages for personal injury to or death of
seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness —
modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541.
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of damages for personal injury or death in actions
under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45
USCS §§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R.
Fed. 189.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so
corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time andJhr_reasons
(lXjft), or (37. notjiiore than 3 months after the judgment>_Qrder^or proceeding
was gifttgred_or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
(Amended effective April 1, 1998.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1998
amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion
the following: a(4) when, for any cause, the
summons in an action has not been personally

served upon the defendant as required by Rule
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action."This basis for a motion is not found
in the federal rule. The committee concluded

